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Innovation with Chinese Characteristics: Theory and Practice
Abstract Purpose – This special issue of Chinese Management Studies aims to engage with 
debates on innovation in China and to provide new insights for innovation research in the 
context of China, seeking to develop a greater understanding of the concept of “innovation with 
Chinese characteristics”. 
Design/methodology/approach – Review and reflection. 
Findings –The nine articles that constitute this special issue present research on important 
aspects of innovation in China, ranging from the effectiveness of government subsidisation for 
innovation, the impact of fiscal decentralisation on innovation, the role of management 
behaviour in promoting (or discouraging) innovation and the effects of differing business 
models on innovation. These articles shed valuable new light on the theory and practice of 
innovation in China. The articles are discussed in the context of four primary arguments about 
innovation management in China identified from the broader literature in the field. These relate 
to the pattern of China’s innovation performance over time, the reasons for its effectiveness, 
the role of alliances and influences of indigenous factors. It is also shown that management of 
the internationalisation of innovation and of efficient internal innovation are two important 
directions for future research on Chinese innovation in an era of de-globalisation.
Originality/value – The studies presented here provide valuable contributions to theory 
building in innovation research, as well as some important ideas for directions of future 
research on innovation in China in the new era of de-globalisation. 
Keywords Innovation, China, de-globalisation, internationalisation of innovation, R&D 
efficiency
Paper type Editorial paper




































































When China embarked on its reform and opening-up drive in 1979, the country made 
modernisation of science and technology one of the four pillars of the new initiative. Forty 
years on, China has transformed itself from an impoverished, economically backward country 
into the world’s second largest economy and, equally impressively, from a backwater of global 
innovation to a country recognised as the world’s hub of science and innovation (Li & Wang, 
2013). China’s remarkable progress in innovation has been well-documented (e.g. Ding & Li, 
2015; Fu, 2015). Yet, the characterisation of the Chinese approach to innovation management 
remains an area where arguments continue to be put forward and theories contested. 
Over the years, four key primary arguments as to China’s innovation management have 
emerged. First, Chinese innovation management is framed in terms of an evolutionary 
economics paradigm. This argument contends that Chinese innovation has followed a 
conventional catch-up pattern for latecomers to an economic field, in which that agent starts 
with learning from frontrunning countries before moving up the innovation ladder, as suggested 
by evolutionary economics theory (Nelson, 2008). Through this lens, it is argued that China’s 
successful catch-up can be attributed to its institutions of knowledge creation and learning as 
well as its access to foreign knowledge (Li, Li & He, 2018). For example, Lee, Jee and Eun 
(2011) identify several elements of learning and access strategies of the Chinese catch-up 
model that are unique to China and not found in the corresponding models of Taiwan or Korea. 
These unique features include: (1) parallel (indirect) learning from foreign direct investment 
(FDI) firms, (2) “forward engineering” (a role performed by university spin-off firms) in 
contrast to reverse engineering adopted in Korea and Taiwan, and (3) acquisition of technology 
and brands through international mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and going global 
(zouchuqu) at an earlier stage of economic development. Along this line, Bound, Saunders, 
Wilsdon and Adams (2013) have referred to China as an “absorptive state” that has become 
increasingly adept at attracting and profiting from global knowledge and networks.
A second argument attributes Chinese innovation management to the country’s ability to 
compete successfully on the elements of creativity and cost (Economist, 2010). This ability to 
make established products at dramatically lower cost is dubbed “frugal innovation” in broad 
terms (Zeschky, Widenmayer & Gassmann, 2011). In this model, innovation is primarily 
concerned with redesigning products, using existing technology in imaginative new ways, and 
applying mass production techniques across the value chain. Frugal innovation not only 
addresses the unmet or underserved market needs of customers at the bottom of the pyramid 
but it also provides an impetus for innovation in other forms that is made possible by the 
expansion of markets.
While the phenomenon of shanzhai innovation that emerged in China in the 1980s has been 
seen as part of the “frugal innovation” model (Economist, 2010), more recent studies consider 
shanzhai to be a much broader phenomenon than just the cheap copying of goods. For example, 
Zhu and Shi’s (2010) research points out that shanzhai manufacturing is typified by the rapid 
production cycle of the products – concept to delivery is often achieved within weeks. Keane 
and Zhao (2012) view shanzhai innovation as an example of rapid prototyping. Liu, Xie and 
Wu (2015) emphasise the importance of modularisation and the evolution of value chains in 
shanzhai innovation that significantly lower the technological threshold of entering markets 
such as the mobile phone business, promote disruptive innovations, and accelerate latecomers’ 
accumulation of knowledge and technology. In more specific terms, the evolution of value 
chains leads to an outcome in which some firms in possession of better technologies can refocus 
their business on the design and production of chipsets and software, while others with other 



































































advantages such as market information can reallocate their efforts towards cosmetic design, 
differentiation, or marketing. For Maarten Beekers,1 a US technology commentator, the 
practice of shanzhai represents an open-source approach to manufacturing, which enables 
factories to bootstrap new products and penetrate new markets, all in a highly efficient way. 
This is made possible as manufacturing industries in China have developed, and traditional 
contract manufacturers have also grown in size, mainly catering to multinational brands. Some 
young entrepreneurs have seen this as an opportunity to start producing goods, in smaller 
volumes, for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). As a result, during the 1990s in particular 
a dense network of small manufacturing businesses emerged in China comprising component 
producers, traders, design houses, vendors and assembly lines.
A third interesting argument frames Chinese innovation management in accordance with the 
model of ‘alliance capitalism’ (Higgins, 2015). This is defined as a strategic approach in which 
government actors and firms develop embedded relational ties and collaborative R&D activity 
with other firms and economic and technological actors in order to engage in innovative 
upscaling and product d velopment. The primary goal of such alliances is to anticipate future 
market and ecosystem requirements and to use this information to build a critical network of 
interdependent alliance partners that are focused on achieving technological “convergence” 
and “interoperability” across the ecosystem platform.
In conclusion, a fourth research approach explores the emergence of China’s indigenous 
innovation capabilities as being driven by China’s ambitions in this field (Vinig & Bossink, 
2015). Such research emphasises the development of Chinese innovation based on a view of 
the country leading and developing innovation theory independently in its own right rather than 
merely using and building on Western-centric innovation theory. Chinese innovation efforts 
are strongly science-based and technology driven, aimed at moving China towards self-
sufficiency as an innovation-based economy. Relevant questions that arise in this context are: 
should new theoretical approaches to theorising China-based innovation be considered? Should 
the specific context of each activity China conducts itself be the basis of theorising? Is the 
innovation system of China intrinsically and completely different from that of Western 
countries, or do they share some fundamentals and differ on others? 
Despite the growing literature on Chinese innovation, consensus as to a unique model of 
Chinese innovation management has yet to emerge. However, the papers collected in this 
special issue seek to provide a number of new and important research frameworks relating to 
various aspects of innovation in China and so shed further light on this topic and advance our 
understanding of the concept of “innovation with Chinese characteristics”.
2. Overview of the special issue
In terms of China’s economy, the year 2018 was celebrated as the 40th anniversary of China’s 
embarkation on the process of reform and opening-up. To mark this significant milestone, Jilin 
University and Amsterdam Business School joined together to convene the 5th Global 
Entrepreneurship and Innovation Conference in Amsterdam on the theme of “Technology 
Entrepreneurship - The Driving Force of Contemporary Business” on 11-12 October 2018. To 
facilitate the dissemination of the outstanding research produced for this conference, Chinese 
Management Studies (CMS) agreed to publish a special issue on the topic of “Innovation with 
Chinese Characteristics: Theory and Practice”. The nine papers presented in this special issue 
have been selected from 49 submissions and have been subject to the journal’s blind peer-
review process. The articles in this CMS special section on Innovation with Chinese 



































































Characteristics highlight a number of specific features of innovation in China and issues that it 
involves. As such, the articles address issues ranging from the effectiveness of subsidisation of 
innovation, the impact of fiscal decentralisation and the role of management behaviour to the 
effects of different business models on this process.
In the first article, Li, Zhou, Jung and Li provide an up-to-date review of the evolution of 
policies and practices of innovation in China over the last 40 years and identify six practices in 
particular that have underpinned the success of innovation in China over this period. Echoing 
Ding and Li (2015), they argue that good practices in managing innovation have consisted of 
formulating successive policies to encourage innovation and carrying out planning strategically, 
thus allowing space for spontaneity of creativity and encouraging “grassroots innovation”, 
while using both the “invisible hand” and the “visible hand” to support innovation. They also 
argue that success for Chinese innovation has also resulted from the country’s effort to engage 
state-owned and privately owned firms in collaborative innovation, so as to encourage 
internationalisation of innovation under the principles of “going out” and “bringing in”, as 
manifested in the latest steps in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and to release the 
entrepreneurial spirit of the Chinese people and to embrace the culture of “common destiny” 
as a new win-win model in international relations and future innovation-driven development.
The next three articles focus on government policies relating to subsidisation of research and 
development (R&D) and fiscal decentralisation. Wang, Hu and Yang examine the effect of 
government subsidies on China’s regional innovation performance, using the Bayesian model 
averaging (BMA) method. Subsidies are shown to be an important policy tool as the authors 
outline that China’s R&D subsidies for high-tech industries increased from CNY 3.910 billion 
in 2006 to CNY 210.183 billion in 2015, an average annual growth rate of 43.8%. The authors 
use the proportion of government funds in th  internal expenditure of R&D funds to measure 
the degree of government R&D subsidies for high-tech industries, and new product sales 
revenue of high-tech industries to measure regional innovation performance. Their empirical 
results show that government subsidies have a negative relationship with regional innovation 
output. They interpret this result as evidence of the crowding-out effect, meaning that firms use 
government subsidies to substitute for their own R&D investment.
Taking a different approach, Wang, Li and Sun examine the effect of government R&D 
subsidies on firm performance, using Chinese A-share listed company data from 2008 to 2016. 
They find a positive impact of R&D subsidies on return on assets (ROA) after controlling for 
a range of corporate characteristics, suggesting a positive effect for government R&D subsidies 
on firm performance. They also find that the relationship between R&D subsidies and ROA is 
non-linear, indicating that it is only when R&D subsidies are given within a moderate interval 
that firms can perform better. The authors argue that R&D subsidies play a vital role in 
enhancing firm performance mainly via two mechanisms, namely signal financing and 
innovation incentives. Finally, they find evidence that suggests that the effect of government 
R&D subsidies is greater in non-state-owned, more recently established, and large enterprises.
Focusing on a novel issue in the field, Yang, Li and Li examine the impact of fiscal 
decentralisation on city innovation performance in China, using a panel data of China’s 278 
cities from 2003 to 2016. The authors use the ratio of city budgetary expenditure per capita to 
the sum of central, provincial and city budgetary expenditure per capita to measure the degree 
of fiscal decentralisation. They estimate a patent renewal model and aggregate the forecast 
market value of the patent at the city level to construct an index of city innovation. Their 
research finds that fiscal decentralisation has significantly inhibited city innovation and that 



































































this inhibiting effect demonstrates the characteristics of a “V” type variation. They argue that 
the reasons behind this negative effect are twofold: fiscal decentralisation weakens the central 
government’s ability to guide local governments to implement its innovation-driven strategy; 
and fiscal decentralisation weakens the central government’s ability to restrain local 
governments’ preference for self-interest in favoring investments emphasising production and 
neglecting innovation. They further show that the influence of fiscal decentralisation on city 
innovation presents clear spatial and temporal heterogeneity. Geographically, the inhibition of 
fiscal decentralisation on city innovation in eastern China is significantly weaker than that in 
central and western China. Temporally, after the implementation of China’s innovation-driven 
development strategy in 2013, the negative impact of fiscal decentralisation on city innovation 
disappeared.
The focus of the next three articles shifts to firm behaviour and its impacts. Hai, Yin, Gao and 
Chen analyse the impact of R&D volatilities on market value and the moderating effect of 
executive overconfidence, employing a panel dataset covering 902 Shanghai and Shenzhen A-
share manufacturing list d firms. In this context, R&D volatilities indicate shifts in a firm’s 
innovation strategies between exploratory innovation (positive shift) and exploitative 
innovation (negative shift), as reflected by changes in R&D expenditure away from the firm’s 
historic trend. The authors find that positive R&D volatilities have a significant positive impact 
on market value, suggesting that the shift of innovation strategy to exploratory innovation helps 
firms change the trajectory of technological development and acquire competitive advantage 
which in turn enhances their market value. They also find that negative R&D volatilities have 
a significant positive impact on market value, indicating that the shift from exploratory 
innovation to exploitative innovation helps firms to consolidate competitive advantage and 
achieve better performance. Finally, they report that the relationship between R&D volatilities 
and market value is moderated by executive overconfidence.
Dai and Taube explore the functionality of long tail markets (LTM) in new products and 
business development through two Chinese cases: the Fintech sector and low-speed electric 
vehicles (LSEV). They argue that the alternative approach of leveraging LTM for new business 
models and technologies rather than competing head-on with powerful incumbents in the 
mainstream markets promotes the introduction of new technologies and business models. Their 
research identifies three strategies to explore LTM for businesses, i.e. identifying a specific 
customer base, being aware of localisation products, and dealing skilfully with regulations.
Focusing on a concept relevant to many aspects of China’s society and economy, Zhao and 
Vinig investigate how guanxi and guanxi intensity may affect reward-based crowdfunding 
success and project performance in the Chinese context, using research data on 989 
crowdfunding projects collected from China’s largest reward-based crowdfunding platform 
zhongchou.com over the one-year period January-December 2014. They find that project 
developers’ guanxi-building behaviour displayed before launching their own projects, through 
for example being supportive of other projects, is positively related to project success. In 
addition, the intensity of guanxi-building behaviour positively influences project performance 
in a significant way. Moreover, the establishment and maintenance of project developers’ 
guanxi with funders during the fundraising process are also positively associated with project 
success and fundraising performance.
The final two articles in this special issue turn to broader studies. Sun and Ai investigate the 
effect of home political connections on the cost structures of Chinese multinationals. Framing 
their research in terms of social exchange theory, the authors argue that the costs of home 



































































political connections arising from reciprocity commitments to the government in outbound 
M&As of Chinese multinationals outweigh the benefits. The costs are higher for lower-level 
political connections. Using a sample of 225 M&A deals, they test and confirm the negative 
effect of home political connections on the internationalisation of Chinese multinationals. Also, 
the negative impact of lower-level political connections is stronger than that of their higher-
level counterparts.
Zhu and Fang provide a systematic review of the literature over the period 2000 to 2018, in 
Chinese and English, presenting research on innovation performance. Based on the systematic 
literature review, the authors identify three characteristics of the research in this specific 
domain. First, the momentum of research on innovation performance in the English literature 
has been increasing, whereas that in the Chinese literature has declined in recent years. Second, 
research in both Chinese and English literature has covered similar streams such as “innovation 
system/elements”, “innovation activity/ability” and “innovation network/social capital”. Third, 
although the directions are the same, the specific contents of research have been different. The 
“hot topics” in the English literature have been “sourcing knowledge” and “culture value” in 
the “innovation system/elements” stream, “supply chain management” (SCM) in the 
“innovation activity/ability” stream, and “licensed-knowledge attributes” in the “innovation 
network/social capital” stream. By contrast, the “hot topics” in the Chinese literature have been 
“technology transfer” in the “innovation system/elements” stream, “resource acquisition” and 
“external innovation search” in the “innovation activity/ability” stream, and “cooperation 
experiences” in the “innovation network/social capital” stream. Using insights obtained from 
this review, the authors propose three directions for future innovation performance research: 
expanding research in hot topics, connecting research streams to extend research scope, and 
exploring new fields of innovation performance.
3. Some future research directions in the era of de-globalisation
Following the overview of the research in this special issue presented above, it is appropriate 
to make a few brief observations here about the current international environment in which 
innovation must take place at present, and some of the key research questions that this gives 
rise to as to the most effective future path for China’s innovation efforts. 
The world has changed significantly since the global financial crisis of 2008. Slow global 
economic growth has become the new normal, global trade protectionism is rising, cross-border 
flows of trade, finance and investment are declining, global supply chains are disintegrating, 
and the current rules of the world trading system are being challenged. This unfolding retreat 
of globalisation is termed de-globalisation. The international trade policies that have headlined 
the first three years of the Trump presidency in the US have brought about a spurt in the pace 
of de-globalisation. These developments will necessarily affect both the nature and rate of 
China’s innovation process. Specifically, the technology contest that is part of the US-China 
trade war will have a far-reaching effect on Chinese innovation. As the Economist has noted, 
the trade conflict that matters most between America and China is a 21st-century fight over 
technology.2 With the determination of the US to deter China’s rise to becoming a technology 
leader and China’s resolve to move up the technology ladder, both countries could find it 
difficult to reconcile their respective national interests. There is a real danger that the 
technology contest could lead to the decoupling of science and technological innovation 
between the world’s two largest economies, dividing the world’s R&D chain into two parallel 
innovation ecosystems.3 The new era of globalisation and the economic and social problems 



































































behind it require critical review of, and reflection on, the theory, practice and policies of 
innovation in China, and fresh thinking about new models of innovation.
Despite the rise of nationalism and retreat of globalisation, the underlying factors favouring 
open innovation in fact still hold. On the one hand, good ideas and innovation will undoubtedly 
continue to flow as a result of the processes of connecting, fusing and recombining by economic 
agents and policy-makers and established patterns and understandings will reinvent themselves 
by crossing conceptual, organisational and national borders. On the other hand, no one can 
establish supremacy in all fields in the light of the complexities of today’s technologies and 
supply chains. Hence, the ongoing technology contest between the US and China does not 
support the argument that China should turn its back to open innovation by reverting to an aim 
of self-sufficiency in technologies. The scale of China’s home market may indeed provide 
Chinese firms with an indispensable cushion against the damaging forces released from the 
technology contest for the time being. However, by focusing innovation exclusively on the 
home market Chinese companies could fall into the trap of cutting themselves off from the 
wider world and the bigger ideas it contains. 
Nonetheless, the changing environment also suggests that the balance between internal and 
external resources has shifted, because developing and possessing internal R&D capabilities 
can be argued to be more important when there exists a heavy reliance on relationships with 
other actors. This calls for a greater understanding of different forms and practices of openness. 
In this context, management of internationalisation of innovation and management of efficient 
internal innovation are two important directions for research on Chinese innovation going 
forward.
3.1 Management of internationalisation of innovation
The internationalisation of innovation by Chinese firms over the last decade has typically taken 
one of three forms. The first was to use business joint ventures and setting-up of research 
centres abroad to access and generate cutting-edge technologies from the host countries. For 
example, Huawei has set up 36 joint innovation centres and 16 research centres worldwide.4 
The second was to use mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to obtain technologies critical for 
Chinese firms to advance in the value chain. The third was to use corporate venture funds to 
invest in technology start-ups in the US and Europe in order to have a stake in emerging 
technologies. Traditionally, a firm’s collaboration with external partners has been seen to entail 
two types of costs (Grant, 1996), i.e. the costs of coordination and competition. Costs of 
coordination emerge from organisations that are different, where it may be difficult to bridge 
organisational boundaries. Costs of competition emerge from the risk that one actor might act 
opportunistically in bad faith. However, the US’s recent ban on technology exports to Huawei 
indicates another form of cost emerging from the firm’s deep dependence on external core 
technologies – costs of strategic control. Clearly, openness is beneficial only when the firm 
chooses the correct and concomitant configuration of both the open and the closed resource 
(Alexy, West, Klapper & Reitzig, 2018). In 2010, Dahlander & Gann asked: How open is 
innovation? The question remains relevant today. 
In the face of the US ban, Huawei’s response so far has been revealing. First, in spite of facing 
being cut off from the American technology supply and being barred from joining the global 
research chain (as shown, for example, by the fact that in the wake of the sanctions, Stanford 
University and MIT in the US, and the University of Oxford in the UK, cut funding ties with 
Huawei), the company maintained that it would still embrace American technologies so long 
as they are made available to them. It was also determined to keep their innovation system 



































































open. In doing that, the company has reallocated its R&D investment globally to mitigate the 
effect of US ban. For example, it was reported that in October 2019 Huawei had bought a stake 
in Oxford Sciences Innovation that commercialises research at Oxford University, which 
would give the company access to some of the most promising early stage technology 
developed by academics in the UK.5 Second, the company quickly revealed that it had secretly 
worked on its own proprietary operating system named as HarmonyOS for nearly ten years and 
would install it in their smartphone products should the company’s access to Google’s android 
system be blocked completely. Third, the company announced that it would invest USD 1.5 
billion to support application developers world-wide to nurture the development of its own 
innovation ecosystem.6 
The case of Huawei suggests a number of questions that future research on Chinese innovation 
needs to tackle. What are the firm- or environmental-level factors that may moderate the effect 
of openness on competitive advantage? How should firms in China balance generic, non-firm 
specific R&D with strategic, firm specific R&D? What strategy could represent a win-win 
approach to internationalising R&D? In terms of the internationalisation of R&D, how should 
firms in China manage intra‐ and inter‐regional geographic diversification? How should 
Chinese firms develop innovation ecosystems? How could firms in China utilise government 
support to deal with the challenges of de-globalisation? How could firms in China deal with 
institutional pressures from host countries?
3.2 Management of efficient internal innovation
The new era of de-globalisation compels firms in China to find a balance between a search for 
external sources of innovation and the development of internal innovation capabilities. While 
adapting the process of internationalisation of R&D to the new era of de-globalisation is 
imperative, equally important for Chinese firms is to improve innovation efficiency. China’s 
innovation drive over the past several decades has been supported by the unprecedented level 
of funding directed to R&D. For example, China spent over CNY 1.96 trillion (around USD 
293 billion) on R&D in 2018, up 11.6 per cent compared with the level in 2017.7 In 2019, 
China established a new state-backed semiconductor fund worth USD 28.9 billion in order to 
advance its domestic semiconductor R&D and reduce its reliance on US technology.8 China’s 
incentive for injecting more resources into its innovation system to support R&D in general 
and strategic industries in particular will be certainly strong if the technology contest lingers 
on. Yet, the concern is that the productivity of R&D investment in China overall has been 
unsatisfactory. There is consistent evidence pointing to the low R&D efficiency of firms in 
China. As but one example, empirical research using data on 38 Chinese new energy 
enterprises from 2009 to 2013 found that new energy enterprises are generally inefficient when 
it comes to innovating (Wang, Hang, Sun & Zhao, 2016). It has also been found that state 
ownership enables firms to obtain crucial R&D resources but makes them less efficient in using 
those resources to generate innovation (Li & Li, 2014; Zhou, Gao & Zhao, 2017). As a result, 
the level of inputs is not consistently translated into successful innovation outputs. Kennedy 
(2017) characterises this economy characterised by low transformation of inputs into successful 
high-tech advancement as a “fat” tech dragon. It is not a surprise that a recent meta-analysis of 
the relevant literature on a large number of countries at different stages of economic 
development found that the growth-enhancing effect of R&D spending in China has been 
significantly weaker than that in other countries (Ljungwall & Tingvall, 2015).
The underlying causes of innovation inefficiency in China are multifaceted. At the innovation 
support system level, the problems relate to the duplication of science and technology (S&T) 
projects, lack of transparency in S&T management, and low efficiency in fund use (Ding & Li, 



































































2015). At the regional level, the problems are found to be related to a mismatch between 
upstream public research organisation-centred research processes and downstream firm-
centred commercialisation processes when the downstream commercialisation process plays a 
more important role in the innovation processes in the region as a whole (Chen & Guan, 2012). 
At the firm level, the problems are found to be linked with the low absorptive capacity for the 
potential outputs of the increasing R&D inputs and the inefficiency of the technology 
commercialisation processes (Han, Thomas, Yang, Ieromonachou & Zhang, 2017). Important 
research questions will be: how could government agencies work collaboratively to identify 
and support novel S&T projects? How could governments make the funding mechanism of 
S&T projects fair and transparent? How could S&T fund be used more efficiently? How could 
regional innovation systems align upstream public research organisation-centred research 
processes and downstream firm-centred commercialisation processes more closely? How could 
firms improve their absorptive capacity? How could firms enhance the efficiency of technology 
commercialisation processes?
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